Financing innovation, a geo-economic battle
European startups are part of a European financial ecosystem undergoing major changes to successfully support the digital transition and scale-up phases. This ecosystem is increasingly inspired by the American and Chinese models, based on venture capital for the start-up phase and large institutional private equity funds for the intermediate stages of maturity. [1]
In the past, equity financing was less widespread in Europe, favoring bank credit, but this dynamic has changed in recent years. In 2023, startups in Europe will have raised $45 billion, representing 18% growth compared to 2020, although this is still relatively low compared to the US, raising over $120 billion. The picture remains positive for Europe, which is on par with China ($48 billion raised in 2023) and is the only continent to show a growth trend between 2020 and 2023. [2]
Europe’s performance is noteworthy against a backdrop of tightening monetary policy worldwide (high interest rates and reduced asset buybacks by central banks). Better even, the 2021 peak in fundraising, represented $100 billion invested European tech ecosystem, an amount that brings it close to the United States. [3]
For the fifth straight year, France has outperformed Germany and the UK as Europe’s top destination for foreign investment, financing 1,194 projects despite a 5% annual decline. Overall, European investment projects dropped by 4%, with the UK and Germany experiencing declines of 6% and 12% respectively. The UK managed 985 FDI projects in 2023, while Germany recorded 733. France’s success is attributed to reforms like the PACTE law and changes to labor legislation, enhancing its market attractiveness. Despite political instability and Brexit impacts causing a 6% drop in FDI, the UK remains a strong contender, especially London. However, investment levels in the UK are still below pre-Brexit figures. The decline in US-funded European projects by 15%, influenced by the Inflation Reduction Act, further highlights the competitive FDI landscape. France’s success is notable, though many projects are extensions, with only 36% being new ventures compared to 75% in the UK and 77% in Germany. [4]
In light of increasingly challenging financing conditions and the imperative for tech startups to scale, domestic investors must step in to replace the foreign funds that are gradually withdrawing from Foreign Direct Investments.
Nevertheless, there are limits to Europe’s ability to compete with its American and Chinese counterparts in tech financing. The primary reason is the size and structure of the European market, which remains fragmented along national lines. As demonstrated by the following graph, pension funds and large institutional investors predominantly channel their investments into Venture Capital structures within their own country. According to a variant of Kenneth Rogoff’s saving theory, this is not the most efficient investment strategy. Ideally, savings should be allocated to countries with higher growth prospects and where the return on capital is maximized.
To win the digital race and create companies of critical size, especially in a “winner takes all” competitive environment, we need to understand how to boost tech financing in Europe. However one shouldn’t paint a completely gloomy picture, indeed the sector is still growing fast and Europe has the technical skills to attract start-ups, thanks to the quality of its scientific training, and maintains a positive trend in attracting skills from abroad. Europe also has an institutional environment conducive to the emergence of a vast startup creation ecosystem. However,greater efforts are needed to attract financial flows into and within Europe to bring it into line with its foreign rivals.
A perfect example of this is the promising French start-up Mistral AI, which, despite its success in attracting French politicians and some of the country’s leading billionaires: Rodolphe Saadé (CMA-CGM), Xavier Niel (Iliad), had to seek external funding. Among which American business angels, funds and companies: Eric Schmidt (ex-Google), Nvidia and, more recently, Microsoft, as well as other major American funds. [6]
Mechanisms at work
The mechanisms at play are economic, cultural and political. First of all, the agglomeration effects mentioned by Paul Krugman (Geography and Trade) should be emphasized to understand why funding flows more towards Silicon Valley, Miami or the coasts of China. According to Krugman, if all the most successful tech companies are located in Silicon Valley, and more specifically in Palo Alto, it’s because there are indirect spin-offs. Such environments create positive external effects (i.e. actions by people or companies that have a positive impact on the productivity of other people or companies, without monetary compensation): these are known as “spillovers”. [7] In fact, innovation and competition in these sectors are won through proximity to competitors, emulation, the exchange of good practices, know-how and proximity to talent pools (such as Stanford University in the case of Palo Alto). So, cumulatively, a startup creation and an investment are more profitable the more similar activities are concentrated in the same sector.
Except the Norwegian pension fund, which leverages domestic fossil fuel revenues, few large European pension or institutional funds exist and are capable of competing with those in the US. Having them, coupled with the national preference effect, would very quickly boost liquidity in Europe, against the passive savings favored in the French model, with pension contributions geared towards direct intergenerational transfers, real estate and safe assets (i.e. Livret A and life insurance). These long-term funds are capable of channeling savings into growth companies, not just superstars. European cultures are also older, with a high savings rate but oriented towards safe investments that don’t turn to startups. The reason for this is that, unlike working people, older generations do not have the yield imperatives to recover their funds later. [8]
Political constraints include the fragmentation of the European market, with different regulations in each country, language and cultural barriers that lead to mistrust and ignorance of other countries, strong national preferences (investors tend to invest in their own country) and intra-european common investments.
Prudential regulations in Europe, which vary widely from country to country, and accounting standards make long-term equity ownership more costly and volatile, driving institutional savings into sovereign and private debt. We can refer to the economic research carried out by Arvind Subramanian and Raghuram Rajan on the institutional factor that drives up risk premiums and reduces the propensity to internationalize one’s asset portfolio. [9] This can be corroborated by the reluctance of northern countries to direct public investment towards the southern countries of the European Union (Italy, Spain, Greece) with the Next Generation Eu plan, due to political instability or high deficits. [10]
Possible solutions
To remedy these problems, we need a true union of capital markets and a policy of simplifying capital taxation in favor of equity financing, rather than recourse to bank credit. A package of measures has been launched in the EU in 2022 to harmonize corporate insolvency legislation, to simplify the listing of SMEs and “increase the efficiency and predictability of frameworks, in particular for cross-border investments”. The stakes are high to encourage investment in equity markets, when today, over 80% of European household savings are tied up in bank deposits or short-term savings accounts. [11]
A union of capital markets is beneficial for encouraging European investment, and also investment from abroad, as there are often oligopolies over the organizations that deliver financial information (rating agencies, appraisals, etc.), which reduces the quality of this information through its lack of precision and contradictions. This union must therefore encourage the emergence of pan-European players rooted in their own countries.
We need to avoid over-regulation of new technologies, which would discourage investment, and an AI Act that doesn’t force startups to move elsewhere. We need to succeed in boosting European funds by legislating to ensure that “shadow banking” (activities and players that contribute to financing the economic system and are not banks) is not over-regulated. Although these institutions pose a risk to financial stability by being less regulated than banks, they do help reduce the impact of crises on depositors, as in 2008, when the excessive proportion of credit in the economy weakened banks and, consequently, citizens with accounts with them, leading to “bank runs” (when depositors withdraw their assets from banks, causing them to fail).
To help change this cultural bias, it seems important to relaunch efforts to create European HUBs to retain skills and direct the financial flows of major European banks towards Europe, as was the case with projects such as Airbus in aeronautics, which has become a world leader.
Encourage and accentuate public-private partnerships such as France’s public investment bank, Bpifrance. This later lends credibility to startups, offer them the possibility of having a reassuring, long-term public investor whose main mission is to support them at every stage of their growth, and to sell them when they become self-sufficient, which has the direct effect of inspiring private investors’ confidence in these startups.
Strong marketing of the European startup ecosystem, such as the French Tech brand in France, Tech Nation in the UK, the ChooseFrance summit and major events such as VivaTech or the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona, is very important, not only to convince Americans and Chinese, but also Europeans. We need to advertise private equity funds in the same way as Bpifrance does to the general public (with entry tickets as low as 1,000 euros), and succeed in creating funds of truly European critical size in addition to American investments on our soil.
Finally, we need a single financial system supervisor, such as the proposed ESMA (European Securities and Markets Authority), which would be a crucial element in harmonizing the financing framework within the European Union.
The evolution of the geography of financing innovation
The geography of financing innovation has evolved distinctly between developed and developing markets. In the Global North, FinTech emerged post-financial crisis, capitalizing on the availability of expertise and capital. In contrast, the Global South saw FinTech as a solution for underdeveloped banking systems, exemplified by Kenya’s mobile money initiatives [12]. China’s FinTech sector, dominated by big tech firms like Alibaba and Tencent, grew rapidly but faced setbacks due to regulatory challenges and market saturation [13]. The Middle East, Western and Central Asia, and Latin America are late starters but are gradually catching up, emphasizing regional specialties in FinTech innovations [14].
Emerging econometric studies highlight factors influencing FinTech distribution, such as income per capita, venture capital availability, and ICT infrastructure [15]. The USA and UK lead in per capita FinTech investments, while China dominates in absolute terms [16].
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have also shifted their investment strategies due to economic changes. While global growth halved in 2022, SWFs reduced their investments, focusing on safer regions like the USA and Europe over emerging markets [17]. Their interest in start-ups, particularly in tech, health, and renewable energy, remains strong, although investments in IPOs and China have declined due to geopolitical tensions and market instability.
The dilemma of economic sovereignty
The ecosystem of European startups, particularly in the technology sector, illustrates a nuanced struggle between the implementation of inter-European strategies of economic and technological sovereignty, and a quest for growth and internationalization involving international partnerships and investment. This duality is based on the desire to foster globally competitive innovation ecosystems while maintaining control over their development trajectories and economic advantages. [18] The rise of economic and technological warfare has led to a significant reassessment of national and international policies, directing efforts towards consolidating technological sovereignty and securing supply chains. Prioritizing autonomy in the technological field responds to the need to preserve national independence in the face of external conflicts and pressures, particularly in a context where geopolitical tensions exacerbate the risks of dependence on foreign technologies. [19] At the same time, securing supply chains for critical resources, such as semiconductors, is becoming imperative in response to these tensions.
The development of the defense industry, driven by the persistent threat of military conflict, highlights the importance of technological innovation in strengthening national defensive capabilities. [20] In recent years, the remilitarization of many economic powers and the emergence of new high-intensity conflicts have highlighted the central and strategic role of technological innovation. Many civilian technologies, for example, derive directly from technological innovations developed by the armed forces, as in the case of touch screens, GPS or certain aspects of artificial intelligence. [21] Conversely, some civilian technological products can be diverted from their military uses, as in the case of Chinese consumer drones, which are still sold to Russia because they are considered non-military goods. [22] The Pentagon recognizes these challenges, and recently stressed the importance of prioritizing innovation in science and technology to maintain America’s military edge. U.S. policymakers are also looking to the private sector, including commercial enterprises and non-traditional defense contractors, to accelerate technology development and application. The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2022 budget included a record request for research, development, test and evaluation (RDTE). [23] The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is increasingly moving towards the adoption of innovative technologies to enhance its defense capabilities. This transition takes place against the backdrop of increased competition with China and lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, highlighting the importance of AI and other disruptive technologies. Funding for technology start-ups by the defense sector has increased significantly, testifying to the DoD’s growing interest in innovations from Silicon Valley. [24] 100 million a year in artificial intelligence for defence, this represents only 0.6% of the French armed forces’ equipment budget, whereas the Americans invest four times as much for an equivalent budget. [25] The drive to modernize defense strategies through investment in more agile systems, such as AI, has catalyzed a wave of venture capital investment. Between 2019 and 2022, venture capital funding in the defense sector doubled from $16 billion to $33 billion. [26] This influx of capital underscores investors’ recognition of the strategic importance of defense technologies and their considerable market potential. In the face of escalating cyber warfare, cybersecurity policies have been stepped up to protect critical infrastructures, signaling a strategic shift towards prioritizing digital security. The current conflict environment is also encouraging the formation of technology blocs and international partnerships, with the aim of sharing resources and coordinating responses to threats.
In other words, the next technological breakthroughs could come from military or so-called strategic funding. Palantir Technologies is a case in point. Founded by tech entrepreneur Peter Thiel, Palantir has become a key company in the US defense landscape, providing data analysis and AI software to the government. Almost half of its revenues in 2021, or $1.9 billion, came from US government contracts. [27] Palantir’s success illustrates the potential of commercial technologies to transform military operations, although the path to such partnerships is not without obstacles.
In a parallel effort, NATO’s DIANA program seeks to address similar challenges by fostering innovation through a strategic funding mechanism. NATO’s DIANA program is a strategic response to the challenges, both tangible and subtle (hard and soft), faced by the Alliance in a context of global technological competition. By creating a vast transatlantic network of gas pedals and test centers, the program aims to stimulate innovation in key areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and biotechnology, sectors which are essential to maintaining the technological and security superiority of member countries. [28] DIANA’s funding, through a €1 billion venture capital fund, is strategically designed to accelerate the development and integration of dual-use technologies without diluting the capital of innovative companies, thus facilitating wider and faster adoption within militaries and defense industries. This mechanism not only closes the gap between research and the market, but also strengthens the digital sovereignty of NATO nations by ensuring greater control over critical innovations.
Adopting niche innovations developed by NATO allies can significantly enhance allied capabilities. Countries like Estonia and the Netherlands excel in cyber-threat intelligence, misinformation detection, and network security, offering valuable tools in the cyber and information domains. Additionally, NATO benefits from allies’ advancements in small drone, satellite communications, and ballistic-missile technologies. Co-production, particularly in niche advanced capabilities such as FPV drones, is crucial to meet strategic challenges. [29] The value of leveraging native conditions that can be leveraged by the wider alliance can be seen in countries like the Netherlands, where a high concentration of high-tech companies, knowledge economies, and widespread public-private collaborations has resulted in niche capabilities in ballistic-missile defense, sensor systems, and space, communications, and quantum technologies. [30] The Netherlands’ high-tech ecosystem, exemplified by Brainport Eindhoven, showcases the importance of public-private collaborations. [31] This hub now hosts a NATO DIANA accelerator cell, enhancing innovation in ballistic-missile defense, sensor systems, and quantum technologies. DIANA plays a pivotal role by fostering these collaborations and accelerating the dissemination of advanced capabilities across the alliance.
DIANA is therefore much more than just a funding program: it is a crucial initiative to arm the Alliance against new and emerging threats, while fostering an innovative and collaborative environment between members.
French Tech, Europe’s figurehead
In Brussels, France asserts its commitment to technological and economic sovereignty, and assumes that it is looking at issues of technological interdependence “without naivety”. France is also directing its public funding towards so-called “strategic” sectors with its €54 billion France 2030 plan. [33] This is an ambitious initiative to finance innovation, aimed at transforming the French economy by stepping up investment in research and development, and targeting emerging players such as start-ups and industries critical to economic sovereignty. In a war for the attractiveness of the European continent that pits the UK, France and Germany against each other, numerous structural reforms and incentive and marketing initiatives are underway to attract and retain foreign direct investment. [34] France is deploying its now-famous Choose France summit, which will see 15 billion euros invested in 56 projects by 2024, and is adopting a “France” brand dedicated to economic attractiveness, as illustrated by the international “Make It Iconic” campaign. [35]
Innovation, a lever of power
Innovation, research and mastery of dominant technologies are undeniable levers of power in today’s global competition between nations. According to Hervé Coutau-Begarie, strategy is a “dialectic of intelligences in a conflictual environment”, which applies directly to the war of intelligences shaping current geopolitical dynamics. [36] Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and 5G networks are not just technical advances; they have become major axes of global sovereignty and economic power. Mastery of these technologies enables the “powerful” to aim for market supremacy and governance of the world-economy, while for the “weak” it offers a chance to maintain a significant presence on the international chessboard and retain bargaining power.
This struggle for technological supremacy is manifested in the efforts of nations and their innovation ecosystems to develop networks of dominance. Notable examples include IBM’s Q Network, which brings together developers around quantum computing, or the efforts of China and the USA in the race for 5G and artificial intelligence. [37] These nations are deploying strategies in which technology is not just a tool for progress, but an instrument of strategic power, shaping international norms, influencing global policies and reshaping traditional balances of power.
The ability to integrate these technologies into national security and economic development strategies therefore determines not only a nation’s status on the world stage, but also its survival in an increasingly polarized and competitive international environment. The implications of this dynamic are profound, affecting not only international relations but also the internal structure of societies, posing major challenges in terms of security policy and ethics.
Europe at the heart of the Sino-American battle
In the battle to finance innovation, the USA and China are deploying distinct and aggressive strategies, while Europe is seeking its place between these two giants. The United States, through measures such as the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), is tightening its control over foreign investments by broadening the spectrum of transactions examined and lengthening review times, under the guise of national security. [38] This approach is accompanied by an extraterritorial application of their law, using coercive measures to protect and promote their economic interests on a global scale. Finally, there is no shortage of American influence actions to maintain its technological edge; in the US National Security Strategy published in December 2017, instructions are given to “organize the brain drain” to the United States through a selective immigration policy. Christian Harbulot theorizes this approach as a strategy of influence called “cognitive encirclement”, a “non-violent” technique of economic warfare through which the attacker uses the “weapons” of knowledge (norms, soft law, law) to circumvent his adversary, his target, and modify the rules of the game (market, technology, confrontations). [39]
On the other hand, with its Belt and Road Initiative, China is not only developing a global trade strategy, but is also extending its influence in the scientific and technological fields. It is betting on rapid technological catch-up, illustrated by massive investment in cutting-edge sectors such as semiconductors and robotics, and by the creation of networks of influence through initiatives such as the Alliance of international science Organizations (ANSO). This is complemented by a global infrastructure strategy for a digital Silk Road. Finally, it seeks to achieve technological and scientific supremacy through indirect strategies of “encirclement for the purpose of capturing information and knowledge”. [40]
Faced with these maneuvers, Europe finds itself in a delicate position. Historically technologically and economically dependent, it must react to retain its economic power, exacerbated by the challenges posed by the pandemic. The European Union has initiated strategies to strengthen its economic and digital sovereignty, notably through the creation of the European Innovation Council (EIC) and the development of strategic industrial alliances. [41] However, the loss of positions in personal data management [42] and the challenges associated with industrial data governance show that much remains to be done if Europe is to compete effectively with the USA and China to position itself as a strategic geopolitical power in the field of technological innovation.
Conclusion
In the current context of economic warfare and geo-economics, Europe is actively seeking its place, trying to position itself in a global environment largely structured around Sino-American opposition. Faced with the need to assert its technological sovereignty and attract international capital to nurture its innovation ecosystem, the European Union is navigating a complex landscape where investment strategies and control of key technologies are crucial. Geopolitical competition for investment and control of technological advances underscores the importance of Europe developing a robust, self-sustaining ecosystem, while remaining an attractive destination for foreign investment. In this context, the EU is called upon to harmonize its regulatory policies and promote an equity financing culture, in order to strengthen its position in a global dynamic marked by economic tensions and rivalries. This challenge calls for a balanced approach, integrating geo-economic considerations into its development strategies, in order to successfully navigate the tumultuous waters of international competition, while trying to find its way between the two economic giants that are China and the United States.
Europe’s drive for technological sovereignty aims to develop an autonomous, innovative ecosystem that reduces dependence on non-European technology giants and investors. The dilemma lies in harnessing these international funds to fuel growth without compromising the strategic objective of technological and economic autonomy and independence.
The direction of funding flows is influenced by economic theories, such as those proposed by Paul Krugman concerning agglomeration effects, suggesting that proximity to innovation hubs such as Silicon Valley naturally attracts more investment due to the positive externalities associated with dense technological ecosystems. European initiatives to counter this trend often struggle against risk-averse cultural predispositions and political and regulatory fragmentation between EU member states, making it difficult to create a unified and attractive investment landscape.
Tackling these challenges requires a multifaceted strategy that includes regulatory harmonization, the promotion of equity over debt financing, and the development of European venture capital ecosystems capable of supporting startups from seed to scale.
The European startup ecosystem is at a crossroads, where the pursuit of technological sovereignty and the need for substantial growth capital must be carefully balanced. Strategies that enhance the attractiveness of the EU as a unique investment destination, coupled with supportive policies that encourage risk-taking and innovation, are essential to navigating this dilemma.
As Europe strives to maintain its competitive edge and autonomy in the innovation finance landscape, the broader question of globalization looms large. How will the increasing trends of protectionism and nationalism shape the future of global finance for innovation? A critical stance towards these nationalist tendencies is essential, as they often undermine the collaborative spirit necessary for technological advancement. Instead, Europe must champion a strong union of capital markets, fostering a truly integrated financial system that can support robust innovation. By uniting its capital markets and leveraging collective strengths, Europe can create a powerful, cohesive investment landscape that resists the divisive effects of nationalism and fortifies its position as a leader in global technological progress.
Co-write with Romain Poncet for ESCP International Politics Society
Edited by Justine Peries
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